The use of the social sciences in the interpretation of the New Testament emerged from the 1970s and has become a standard methodology for interpreting the New Testament. However, it has not been significantly used in the interpretation of the New Testament in Nigeria by biblical scholars. This article discusses what social-scientific criticism is and the need for its application in the interpretation of the New Testament by Nigerian New Testament scholars for a better understanding of the New Testament and (...) the people, beliefs and teachings it presents and contextualisation in the face of changing contexts of Christianity in Nigeria. Contribution: As far as we know, this article is the first one written on using social-scientific criticism to interpret the New Testament in the Nigerian context. It therefore contributes to the need for a multidisciplinary approach to interpreting the New Testament in Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. It therefore contributes also on methodological considerations with regard to interpreting the New Testament. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel argument against one theoretically attractive form of panpsychism. I argue that “idealist panpsychism” is false since it cannot account for spacetime’s structure. Idealist panpsychists posit that fundamental reality is purely experiential. Moreover, they posit that the consciousness at the fundamental level metaphysically grounds and explains both the facts of physics and the facts of human consciousness. I argue that if idealist panpsychism is true, human consciousness and the consciousness at the fundamental level will have the (...) same metrical structure. However, as I demonstrate, human consciousness does not exhibit the same metrical structure as spacetime. Consequently, the idealist panpsychist faces an explanatory gap between the fundamental consciousness she posits and spacetime. Idealist panpsychism is incompatible with the existence of such an explanatory gap. Thus, idealist panpsychists must close this explanatory gap (which I argue they lack the resources to do), or idealist panpsychism is false. (shrink)

I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If ground functionalism is true, arguments against physicalism based on the explanatory gap between the physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, I argue that some anti-physicalists are already safe from Schaffer’s challenge. These anti-physicalists reject an underlying assumption of ground functionalism: the assumption that macrophysical entities are something over and above (...) the fundamental entities. I call their position “lightweight anti-physicalism.” Second, I go on to argue that even if anti-physicalists accept Schaffer’s underlying assumption, they can still argue that the consciousness explanatory gap is especially mysterious and thus requires a special explanation. I call the resulting position “heavyweight anti-physicalism.” In both cases, the consciousness explanatory gap is a good way to argue against physicalism. (shrink)

In this paper, I present an interpretation of Kant’s view that reason’s hypostasis of the idea of a sum-total of reality is dogmatic and illegitimate. In the section on the ‘Transcendental Ideal’, the second section of the Ideal of Pure Reason chapter in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant starts by describing reason’s procedure from the affirmation of the principle of thoroughgoing determination to the hypostasis in question. According to the interpretation I defend, the argument for hypostasis deployed in this (...) section constitutes an improvement upon an argument defended by the pre-critical Kant himself in his 1673 essay “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God”. By making reference to the concept of omnitudo realitatis, the argument in the ‘Transcendental Ideal’ section presents a much more radical and convincing interpretation of the thesis that ‘possibility presupposes actuality’. Second, I present transcendental idealism and its related distinction between objects of sense and objects in general as the main dissuasive argument of the critical philosopher against hypostasis. Finally, I consider an argument against hypostasis that is independent of transcendental idealism: the threat of set-theoretical paradoxes if we hypostatize the relevant idea, intended as the concept of an absolutely comprehensive totality. (shrink)

Panpsychists aspire to explain human consciousness, but can they also account for the physical world? In this paper, I argue that proponents of a popular form of panpsychism cannot. I pose a new challenge against this form of panpsychism: it faces an explanatory gap between the fundamental experiences it posits and some physical entities. I call the problem of explaining the existence of these physical entities within the panpsychist framework “the missing entities problem.” Spacetime, the quantum state, and quantum gravitational (...) entities constitute three explanatory gaps as instances of the missing entities problem. Panpsychists are obliged to solve all instances of the missing entities problem; otherwise, panpsychism cannot be considered a viable theory of consciousness. (shrink)

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is (...) paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively. (shrink)

In this article we revisit a number of disputes regarding significance logics---i.e., inferential frameworks capable of handling meaningless, although grammatical, sentences---that took place in a series of articles most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy between 1966 and 1978. These debates concern (i) the way in which logical consequence ought to be approached in the context of a significance logic, and (ii) the way in which the logical vocabulary has to be modified (either by restricting some notions, (...) or by adding some vocabulary) to keep as much of Classical Logic as possible. Our aim is to show that the divisions arising from these disputes can be dissolved in the context of a novel and intuitive proposal that we put forward. (shrink)

Though recent years have seen a proliferation of critical histories of international law, their normative significance remains under-theorized, especially from the perspective of general readers rather than writers of such histories. How do critical histories of international law acquire their normative significance? And how should one react to them? We distinguish three ways in which critical histories can be normatively significant: (i) by undermining the overt or covert conceptions of history embedded within present practices in support of their authority; (ii) (...) by disappointing the normative expectations that regulate people’s reactions to critical histories; and (iii) by revealing continuities and discontinuities in the functions that our practices serve. By giving us a theoretical grip on the different ways in which history can be normatively significant and call for different reactions, this account helps us think about the overall normative significance of critical histories and how one and the same critical history can pull us in different directions. (shrink)

© 2016 Elsevier LtdJumping spiders are famous for their visually driven behaviors [1]. Here, however, we present behavioral and neurophysiological evidence that these animals also perceive and respond to airborne acoustic stimuli, even when the distance between the animal and the sound source is relatively large and with stimulus amplitudes at the position of the spider of ∼65 dB sound pressure level. Behavioral experiments with the jumping spider Phidippus audax reveal that these animals respond to low-frequency sounds by freezing—a common (...) anti-predatory behavior characteristic of an acoustic startle response. Neurophysiological recordings from auditory-sensitive neural units in the brains of these jumping spiders showed responses to low-frequency tones —recordings that also represent the first record of acoustically responsive neural units in the jumping spider brain. Responses persisted even when the distances between spider and stimulus source exceeded 3 m and under anechoic conditions. Thus, these spiders appear able to detect airborne sound at distances in the acoustic far-field region, beyond the near-field range often thought to bound acoustic perception in arthropods that lack tympanic ears [2]. Furthermore, direct mechanical stimulation of hairs on the patella of the foreleg was sufficient to generate responses in neural units that also responded to airborne acoustic stimuli—evidence that these hairs likely play a role in the detection of acoustic cues. We suggest that these auditory responses enable the detection of predators and facilitate an acoustic startle response. Video. (shrink)

Sokołowski fut un des plus eminents jesuites-philosophes en Pologne de la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle. Cette dissertation constitue une breve monographie de Sokołowski en tant que philosophe. Elle contient sa biographie, basee sur des sources en majorite inedites, provenant avant tout des Archives Romaines de la Compagnie de Jesus, la liste des ses ecrits et la caracteristique de sa philosophie.

Czy określenie współczesnego świata zachodniego mianem świeckiego jest zasadne? Biorąc pod uwagę upadek „tezy sekularyzacyjnej”, zakładającej ścisły związek między powstaniem nowoczesności a atrofią wiary, a także obserwowane w wielu społeczeństwach zachodnich zjawisko „deprywatyzacji” religii, taka diagnoza współczesności musi wydać się co najmniej wątpliwa. Dlaczego zatem Charles Taylor, uważany za jednego z najwybitniejszych współczesnych filozofów, w taki właśnie sposób określa czasy, w których żyjemy? Czy bliższy prawdy nie jest – głoszony przez przedstawicieli nauk humanistycznych i społecznych – pogląd o nastaniu porządku (...) postświeckiego? Prezentowana książka omawia podstawowe cechy współczesnej kultury, które, w przekonaniu kanadyjskiego myśliciela, świadczą o jej świeckim charakterze. Zwraca się tu szczególną uwagę na wyartykułowany przez Taylora filozoficzny wymiar świeckości, który dotyczy nie tyle naszych przekonań, ile warunkującego je i tym samym bardziej od nich podstawowego „kontekstu rozumienia”. Autor pokazuje, że takie ujęcie problemu pozwala Taylorowi wyjść poza negatywne rozumienie świeckości, postrzegające ją jako residuum powstałe wskutek upadku religii, i nie tylko wskazać na wzajemne zapośredniczenie tych kategorii, lecz także odsłonić historyczny, moralny i społeczny wymiar tego, co świeckie. Uchwycenie historycznego oraz strukturalnego powiązania świeckości z religią umożliwia także dokonanie krytyki niektórych wersji postsekularyzmu. (shrink)

C'est une edition corrigee et augmentee des articles de Darowski, publies precedement - a partir de 1978 - dans differentes revues. Ils concernent tous la Philosophie des jesuites en Pologne et en Lituanie au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecle. Les resumes ou summaria se trouvent a la fin de chaque chapitre. A la fin du livre, l'Auteur a ajoute quelques reflexions methodologiques et historiques sur l'art d'ecrire la philosophie des jesuites en Pologne du XVIe au XVIIIe siecle, ainsi que la bibliographie (...) recente de la philosophie des jesuites de la meme epoque. (shrink)

C'est une edition corrigee et augmentee des articles de Darowski, publies precedement - a partir de 1978 - dans differentes revues. Ils concernent tous la Philosophie des jesuites en Pologne et en Lituanie au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecle. Les resumes ou summaria se trouvent a la fin de chaque chapitre. A la fin du livre, l'Auteur a ajoute quelques reflexions methodologiques et historiques sur l'art d'ecrire la philosophie des jesuites en Pologne du XVIe au XVIIIe siecle, ainsi que la bibliographie (...) recente de la philosophie des jesuites de la meme epoque. (shrink)

Sokołowski fut un des plus eminents jesuites-philosophes en Pologne de la premiere moitie du XVIIe siecle. Cette dissertation constitue une breve monographie de Sokołowski en tant que philosophe. Elle contient sa biographie, basee sur des sources en majorite inedites, provenant avant tout des Archives Romaines de la Compagnie de Jesus, la liste des ses ecrits et la caracteristique de sa philosophie.

The present note revisits the joint work of Leonard Goddard and Richard Routley on significance logics with the aim of shedding new light on their understanding by studying them under the lens of recent semantic developments, such as the plurivalent semantics developed by Graham Priest. These semantics allow sentences to receive one, more than one, or no truth-value at all from a given carrier set. Since nonsignificant sentences are taken to be neither true nor false, i.e. truth-value gaps, in this (...) essay we show that with the aid of plurivalent semantics it is possible to straightforwardly instantiate Goddard and Routley’s understanding of how the connectives should work within significance logics. (shrink)

EVOLUTION OF RELIGION IN MEMETICS (DAWKINS, DENNETT) Since ‘The Selfish Gene’ by Richard Dawkins was published the notion of evolving culture has become a matter of a growing concern which appears to be especially intriguing from the perspective of biology (R. Dawkins), psychology (R. Brodie) as well as philosophy (D. Dennett). The essence of Darwin’s project is a natural selection within the sphere of a natural science. From this standpoint, a human is considered to be an effect of an evolutionary (...) development. In the memetics approach, a human being is perceived in a different manner. An unit of gene, which task is to pass on the information in a process of a natural selection, has been replaced by a notion of a meme that is an entirely new replicator which, as opposed to a gene, may be applied to the various environments, not only a biological one. The crucial factor that determines the uniqueness of every man would be culture. From this point of view, the transfer of culture, which is developing in a specific procedure, is emphasized. What can be included in the evolutionary processes in the vast area of culture? What is the discrepancy between the Dawkins’s biological position and the grounded on a philosophy of mind the position of Dennett? The above mentioned attitudes result in various definitions of meme as well as the further implications that result from these definitions. Does the Theory of Cultural Selection fully explain a matter of the origin and evolution of languages, societies and religions? (shrink)

L'auteur de ce livre est depuis longtemps professeur de philosophie de l'homme a la Faculte de Philosophie de la Compagnie de Jesus a Cracovie. II a publie notamment deux ouvrages collectifs sur ce sujet: Czlowiek i swiat [L'homme et le monde], Cracovie 1972, et Człowiek - istnienie i działanie [L'homme - son existence et son agir], Cracovie 1974. Apres l'Avant-propos et la Bibliographie, ce livre contient 3 parties inegales: 1) Questions preliminaires; 2) L'histoire de la philosophie de l'homme; 3) Principaux (...) problemes de la philosophie de l'homme. (shrink)

L'auteur de ce livre est depuis longtemps professeur de philosophie de l'homme a la Faculte de Philosophie de la Compagnie de Jesus a Cracovie. II a publie notamment deux ouvrages collectifs sur ce sujet: Czlowiek i swiat [L'homme et le monde], Cracovie 1972, et Człowiek - istnienie i działanie [L'homme - son existence et son agir], Cracovie 1974. Apres l'Avant-propos et la Bibliographie, ce livre contient 3 parties inegales: 1) Questions preliminaires; 2) L'histoire de la philosophie de l'homme; 3) Principaux (...) problemes de la philosophie de l'homme. (shrink)

The Renaissance sceptic and medical doctor Francisco Sanchez has been rather unduly neglected in scholarly work on Renaissance scepticism. In this paper I discuss his scepticism against the background of the ancient distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. I argue that Sanchez was a Pyrrhonist rather than, as has been claimed in recent years, a mitigated Academic sceptic. In keeping with this I shall also try to show that Sanchez was crucially influenced by the ancient medical school of empiricism, a (...) school closely allied with Pyrrhonism. (shrink)

In his 2016 book, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion, Paul Bloom argues that “if we want to be good caring people, if we want to make the world a better place, then we are better off without empathy.” I’ve specifically chosen this formulation of Bloom’s position because it gets at the issue I will most directly challenge him on - that we would, or even could, be better off without empathy. The position I will defend is that our (...) empathy plays an indispensable role in the development of our moral conscience, and an ongoing role in the cultivation of our moral concepts, that would be compromised by suppressing our empathy. On this understanding, I argue that we would generally be better served by cultivating our empathy to mitigate and overcome its shortcomings, rather than suppressing our empathy as Bloom recommends. (shrink)

MATTHEW LIPMAN’S METHOD AGAINST THE INDOCTRINATION Nowadays, the problem of indoctrination at schools seems to be quite distant and invalid in the sphere of the pedagogical research. It appears that manipulating students and inculcating certain attitudes and beliefs to them may often be conducted unconsciously, which suppresses students’ remarkable capacities such as critical thinking, frank expression of their own opinions and much broader view on the varied subjects at the same time. The method of M. Lipman appears to be an (...) effective solution for eliminating indoctrination at schools and adopting above mentioned attitudes by the students. After defining and analyzing certain notions concerning indoctrination and education, I present strong and weak points of the method of M. Lipman in excluding the idea of indoctrination at schools. The following writing presents the meaning and the significance of “The Philosophy for Children” in the struggle against the indoctrination. (shrink)

When offering constructions of political values, it is common to generally strive for unity, i.e., to aim at principled definitions and the reduction of normative conflict. In this article, by contrast, I argue that we should aim to construct broad and conflicting concepts of the central liberal democratic values of liberty and equality. Taking my cue from an under-appreciated debate between Ronald Dworkin and Bernard Williams, I suggest that the demand for unity derives its appeal from a juridical model of (...) political value construction, which assumes the unified perspective of public decision-making. But while this model may be apt for constructing institutional rights, the construction of the political values liberty and equality had better operate according to a political model, which focuses on the perspective of citizens that live in a relationship of political opposition. Not only is there no demand for unity from that perspective, but there is a positive demand for political plurality: we need to draw on broad and conflicting concepts of liberty and equality if we are to respect the claims of fellow citizens with whom we have value-based political disagreements. (shrink)

The commentators expressed concerns regarding the relevance and value of non-computational non-symbolic explanations of cognitive performance. But what counts as an “explanation” depends on the pre-theoretical assumptions behind the scenes of empirical science regarding the kinds of variables and relationships that are sought out in the first place, and some of the present disagreements stem from incommensurate assumptions. Traditional cognitive science presumes cognition to be a decomposable system of components interacting according to computational rules to generate cognitive performances (i.e., component-dominant (...) dynamics). We assign primacy to interaction-dominant dynamics among components. Though either choice can be a good guess before the fact, the primacy of interactions is now supported by much recent empirical work in cognitive science. Consequently, in the main, the commentators have failed so far to address the growing evidence corroborating the theory-driven predictions of complexity science. (shrink)

Some recent researches in experimental philosophy have posed a problem for philosophers’ appeal to intuition (hereinafter referred to as PAI); the aim of this paper is to offer an answer to this challenge. The thesis against PAI implies that, given some experimental results, intuition does not seem to be a reliable epistemic source, and —more importantly— given the actual state of knowledge about its operation, we do not have sufficient resources to mitigate its errors and thus establish its reliability. That (...) is why PAI is hopeless. Throughout this paper I will defend my own conception of PAI, which I have called the Deliberative Conception, and consequently, I will defend intersubjective agreement as a means to mitigate PAI errors, offering empirical evidence from recent studies on the Argumentative Theory of Reason that favor the conception I defend here. Finally, I will reply to some objections that might arise against the Deliberative Conception, which will lead me to discuss some metaphilosophical issues that are significantly relevant for the future of the dispute about the appeal to intuition. (shrink)

Artykuł traktuje o libertarianizmie, jego genezie, źródłach i odłamach. Jest to stosunkowo młody ruch ideowo-polityczny. Libertarianie szczególny nacisk kładą na prawa jednostki do własności prywatnej i indywidualizm. Mają krytyczny ogląd instytucji państwa, wyrażający się w postulacie radykalnego ograniczenia jego uprawnień lub też jego demontażu. Minarchizm i anarchokapitalizm stanowią dominujące nurty współczesnego libertarianizmu. Minarchiści opowiadają się za tym, żeby kompetencje państwa zostały zawężone do minimum - powinno ono sprawować pieczę nad wymiarem bezpieczeństwa i całkowicie powściągnąć ingerencję w gospodarkę. Anarchokapitaliści z kolei (...) stoją na stanowisku, że instytucja państwa powinna zostać zniesiona. Uznają oni bowiem, że nie sposób pogodzić wolności jednostki i prawa do własności prywatnej w ramach państwa - nawet takiego, którego władza sprowadza się do zawiadywania sektorami zaznaczanymi przez minar- chistów. Radykalni libertarianie spod znaku anarchokapitalizmu są zdania, że wszelkie uprawnienia państwa powinny zostać przekazane prywatnej inicjatywie. (shrink)

Ewa Domańska, Professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (Poland) and Stanford University (USA), historian of historiography and methodologist of history, formulated interesting comments about the state of humanities and social sciences. The development of interdisciplinary research causes the interpenetration of different disciplines. Although this kind of research is promising, inspiring as well as influencing the development of science, careless research may cause some threats in the longer term. According to Domańska, the lack of qualifications and reliability in this (...) area (especially in the area of theory and methodology) undermines the authonomy of the main disciplines and decline in the professionalism of research. This led the author to create the project, which aims to defend the independence of the threatened disciplines as well as their ‘re-professionalisation’. It can be achieved by strongly emphasizing the role of theory in science; a strong embeddement of a discipline in the theory. Domańska’s concept can be a recipe, which is a dichotomic project. Firstly, it supposes a ‘practical methodology’, which is a constructing of the theory thanks to empirical research material. Secondly, it supposes a ‘virtue epistemology’, which is the ethical aspect of the researcher’s attitude and his work. The aim of the paper is to discuss Domańska’s project and underline the originality of her concept in the context of economic and social sciences. The economic history is a specific discipline which develops at the crossroad of history and economics. It lets me put forward the thesis that Domańska’s suggestions are relevant to the research of economic history. I will show what cognitive chances are the result of the ontology of economic history. I will question what the possible threats are for the main disciplines (history and economics) as a result of the lack of professionalism in the interdisciplinary research of the economic past, and ask if Domańska’s project is attractive for the economic history research thanks to the strong setting in the ‘practical methodology’ in the theory. I also ask what the role of new theoretical approaches in that area is, and whether it is possible to formulate innovatory conceptions in the economic history. Finally, I question the role of ‘virtue epistemology’ or the ethical aspect of an economic historian’s work. (shrink)

This paper argues that theories of truth which seek to specify the ontological ground of true statements by appealing to an ontology of truth‐makers face a severe and possibly insurmountable obstacle in the form of logically complex statements. I argue that there is no apparent way to develop an account of logically complex truth within the confines of a modest and plausible ontology of truth‐makers and to this end criticize independent attempts by Armstrong and Pendlebury to develop such an account.

I ask the following question: “How should theology develop in order to avoid conflicts with neurosciences?” I believe that the answer to this question is a turn towards the monistic structure of human nature. It seems that insisting on the concept of a human being as composed of two realities – the body and the soul – makes it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into a constructive dialogue with neuroscientists who point to a clear connection between consciousness and biological (...) processes. (shrink)

In this chapter I use a film by the Belgian filmmakers Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne, Le Fils, to explore the difference between Stoic and Anti-Stoic approaches to overcoming victimhood. The Stoic approach to overcoming victimhood emphasizes the inner-strength and resourcefulness of victims. It sets up an ideal of Stoic independence in which a person responds to becoming a victim by marshalling inner resources to overcome destructive and painful emotions. An Anti-Stoic approach to overcoming victimhood rejects such an appeal to independence (...) and acknowledges that victims do not generally possess the inner resources needed to eliminate destructive and painful emotions. According to Anti-Stoicism, overcoming victimhood is a risky affair; it requires both courage and luck. I use Le Fils to argue that the Anti-Stoic approach to overcoming victimhood is both more realistic and more valuable than the Stoic approach. (shrink)

In “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics” Janna Thompson argues that by assigning intrinsic value to nonhuman elements of nature either our evaluations become arbitrary, and therefore unjustified, or impractical, or justified and practical, but only by reflecting human interest, thus failing to be truly intrinsic to nonhuman nature. There are a number of possible responses to her argument, some of which have been made explicitly in reply to Thompson and others which are implicit in the literature. In this discussion I (...) describe still another response, one which takes Thompson’s concerns about value seriously, but does not assign nature intrinsic or nonanthropocentric value. I suggest a relational environmental ethic as the basis for a genuinely ethical stance toward nature in which our relations to nature are a principal object of ethical concern. (shrink)

After the emergence of a popular resistance movement to direct rule by an absolutist monarchy, and several years of civil war, King Gyanendra of Nepal yielded power to an elected Congress in 2006. Within one year, Nepali citizens saw the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord, the establishment of a Constituent Assembly, the declaration of the Nepali state, and the declaration of the Nepali Republic a year after that. An Interim Constitution was adopted by 2007, which endowed the Constituent Assembly (...) with the authority to draft Nepal’s permanent Constitution, and established the limitations under which the Assembly must operate — all apparently legitimate steps in establishing a Constitutional order. What initially appeared to adhere to an established model of post-sovereign constitution-making failed in its first attempt. Indeed, the drafting and ratification of a permanent constitution is no easy task. Why did the first Constituent Assembly fail? Where did the constitution-making process divert from the post-sovereign model, and what caused it? I examine the process from the establishment of Nepal’s first Constituent Assembly to the short-lived deliberations of the Assembly, followed by the dissolution of the Assembly for failing to achieve its mandate. I also trace Nepal’s constitution-making process along the post-sovereign model, and assess whether they adhered to or diverted from the model. It is understood that no political models are fixed in the sense that adherence or divergence is necessarily incompatible with success or failure. However, I use Andrew Arato’s post-sovereign model as a guide for identifying the stages in the constitution-making process, and for a background to the discussion on where the first Assembly failed. (shrink)